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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The essay analyses an ongoing tendency that is transforming a traditional cornerstone of 
constitutional and administrative law in Italy, such as the principle of legality. This progressive 
makeover is given by the reflections in the internal legal order of the joint effect of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, together with the integration in the 
European Union, that are producing a progressive shift to a more substantial and comprehensive 
concept of the “rule of law”. The main reason for this seems to derive from the so-called 
“democratic disconnect” that affects the supranational legal orders and weakens the preference 
traditionally acknowledged to parliamentary legislation. Due also to the low quality of the internal 
legislation, the Italian Highest Courts are following the hints coming from the outside and both the 
Court of Cassation and the Constitutional court are slowly embracing a more comprehensive idea of 
what “law” is, closer to the idea typical of the “common law” systems. 
The results of this evolution are a progressive decline of the formal categories that dominated the 
literature in the past decades as well as, at the same time, the risk of losing also the democratic 
meaning of legality, represented by the necessary linkage between the system of sources of law and 
the form of government. In other words, relocating the role of parliamentary legislation means 
rethinking the role of Parliaments vis-à- vis both the Government and the courts in the 
contemporary State. The essay fosters the reflection on this process and on its potential 
disadvantages for the good functioning of the democracy. 
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1.	MOVING	ON	FROM	A	DISAGREEMENT:	THE	CONTENT	(AND	THE	
ROLE)	OF	LEGALITY	IN	THE	ITALIAN	LEGAL	ORDER	
 
 A few principles of law embody such cornerstone of the constitutional and administrative 
architecture as the principle of legality. In general, the idea of correspondence between the legal 
framework and the state of order of public power entails the idea in itself of a legal order. However, 
paradoxically, one can hardly find a definition of the above-mentioned principle that is unanimously 
accepted in continental Europe or even in a single legal order,1 and some authors even openly prefer 
not to define it, claiming that any attempt at a more precise elaboration beyond this simple noun 
phrase might weaken or reduce its potentialities2. 
Just to give an idea about how deep (and even harsh) has been the debate among scholars on this 
topic, it could be interesting to recall a famous cross-talk originated within the Italian Public Law in 
1995 between Andrea Orsi Battaglini and Sabino Cassese, which sparked in because of the editorial 
of the former in the opening issue of the Journal “Diritto pubblico”.3 In particular, Cassese 
contested the idea of granting priority in the new journal to the investigation of the principle of 
legality, considering it to be “a passe-partout notion” that is still used “due to tiredness”. 4 
Moreover, he pointed out that setting the focus on the principle of legality would have meant paying 
excessive attention to the law-maker(s), while the most active and “modern” part of administrative 
law relies on the courts, which were able to enlarge their role and re-define the concept of what 
“lawful” is (to wit, what complies with the law in a more general sense) beyond the exclusivity of 
written norms, and operating upon the basis of higher principles of “reason” and “justice”. 
In his prompt reply, Orsi Battaglini refused to trace legality back to its narrower sense conceived in 
the XIX century (thereby constraining it to the mere compliance of the activity of the administration 
to the legislative provision), emphasized its democratic dimension, significantly linking popular 
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1
 On such lack of agreement it might be appropriate to recall the well known paradox of Böckenförde, according to 
which the contemporary secular State relies on premises that it is not able to justify (E.W. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Die 
Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisierung (1964), now in Kirche und christlicher Glaube in den 
Herausforderungen der Zeit (Lit-Verlag 2004), p. 213-230. 
2
 L. CARLASSARE, Legalità (principio di), in Enciclopedia giuridica, XVIII, Treccani, 1990, p. 4. 
3
 A. ORSI BATTAGLINI, In limine, in Diritto pubblico, 1995, p. I at p. III. 
4
 S. CASSESE, Alla ricerca del Sacro Graal. A proposito della rivista Diritto pubblico, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto 
pubblico (1995), p. 789 at p. 794. 
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sovereignty, democratic representation, parliamentary legislation, highlighting, by means of the 
latter, the relationship between (public) power and (individual) freedom. 5 
These two opposite interpretations of the same principle are not a peculiarity of the Italian debate. A 
similar divergence can be found through the comparison of different legal system in the European 
legal space, and often in the individual national legal order, depending on the interpretation given to 
this principle. 
The origins of such divergences are above all rooted in traditional concepts of the European legal 
culture, such as the Anglo-Saxon idea of the rule of law, the German concept of Rechtsstaat, and 
the French elaboration on the État de droit. Consequently, the idea of ‘legality’ might be associated 
with one or the other, considering that they – even in the different declination of each individual 
concept – all share some common basic principles.6 Although, at the same time, they diverge 
significantly because of the role attributed to parliamentary legislation,7 and because of the 
recognition of the existence of the state as the source of legitimacy of public power.8 
For instance, the development of the legal systems in continental Europe in the XIX century was 
mainly based upon the assignment to parliamentary legislation of the discipline of some 
fundamental freedoms, thereby setting limitations to the intervention of sources of law other than 
parliamentary statutes. These limitations (according to national languages, known as reserve de loi, 
Gesetzesvorbehalt, reserva de ley, riserva di legge) are unfamiliar to the legal systems of common 
law, so that it is even hard to find a good translation of these terms in English. The very idea of a 
reservation to parliamentary legislation represents the link between the system of the sources of law 
and the inter-institutional balance in the form of government, in which the higher place is given to 
the source of law stemming from the constitutional body with the strongest popular legitimacy.9 
The main objection against this approach relies on a general suspicion about the implementation of 
the rule of law mainly through parliamentary statutes, because of its foundation on majority 
decisions, and on a preference for the guaranteeing of rights on the part of the judiciary.10 On the 
other hand, a focus based exclusively or mainly upon the courts and upon the judicial protection of 
                                                 
 
5
 A. ORSI BATTAGLINI, Il puro folle e il perfetto citrullo (Discutendo con Sabino Cassese), in Diritto pubblico, 1995, p. 
639-651. 
6
 N. MCCORMICK, Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, in Juristen-Zeitung, 1984, p. 65-70. 
7
 L. BESSELINK et aal., Introduction: Legality in Multiple Legal Orders, in L. Besselink et aal (eds.), The eclipse of the 
Legality Principle in the European Union, Kluwer Law International 2011, p. 3-10. 
8
 M. LOUGHLIN, Foundations of Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 312; B. SORDI, Révolution, Rechtsstaat, 
and the Rule of Law: historical reflections on the emergence of administrative law in Europe, in S. Rose-Ackerman and 
P.L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law, Edward Elgar 2011, p. 23-36.  
9
 A. PIZZORUSSO, Sistema delle fonti e forma di Stato e di governo, in Quaderni costituzionali, 1986, p. 217-235; F. 
DELPÉRÉE, Constitutional Systems and Sources of Law, in A. Pizzorusso (ed.), Law in the making. A comparative 
survey, Springer Verlag, 1988, p. 88-102. 
10
 among others S. CASSESE, Die Zukunft war früher auch besser, in C. Franchini-B.G. Mattarella (eds.) Sabino Cassese 
e i confini del diritto amministrativo, ES, 2011, p. 92. 
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rights might weaken the added value of political participation through parliamentary bodies, 
potentially affecting the democratic nature of law-making and the transparency of its proceedings11. 
To introduce briefly the debate among Italian public law scholars, it is sufficient to mention that 
there is any general agreement neither on the relevance nor on the content of legality. Just to quote 
the leading opinions in the literature, some authors proposed it as a criterion for constitutional 
interpretation, recognizing its grounding value for the entire legal order, so much so that it was to be 
used also in the judicial review of legislation12; others have deemed it as a general principle of the 
legal system, but in the sense that it is at the disposal of Parliament.13 Furthermore, others have 
objected that too broad an interpretation of the principle of legality would have even deprived the 
system of riserva di legge of its meaning: if everything in the Constitution required the intervention 
of a parliamentary statute, those provisions of the Constitution that specifically require it in the 
substance of the subject matter would become either meaningless or a source of great confusion.14 
In short, the interpretations of legality vary profoundly depending on the doctrines, so that they may 
differ – at the very least – from some minimalist concepts such as (i) the mere imposition upon the 
public administration not to infringe the legal framework (independently of how the latter is 
composed, making this approach applicable also to authoritarian regimes, in which the idea of the 
rule of law is reduced to that of rule by law),15 or (ii) the requirement of a previous legal command 
to enable the action of the administration; to a “maximum”, as (iii) a democratic linkage between 
the concrete activity of the executive power to the legislative choices made by the representative 
body.16 
 
2.	LEGALITY	IN	SUPRANATIONAL	DIMENSION:	THE	“DEMOCRATIC	
DISCONNECT”	IN	THE	EUROPEAN	SPACE	
 
 Almost 20 years later the picture looks a bit different, and the scenario depicted by Cassese 
seems closer to reality, in Italy and elsewhere in contemporary Europe. In particular, the 
supranational Courts operating in Europe (the European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter 
                                                 
 
11
 J. WALDRON, Legislation and the Rule of Law, in Legisprudence, 2007, p. 91-123; R. BELLAMY, Political 
Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 
52. 
12
 L. CARLASSARE, Regolamenti dell’esecutivo e principio di legalità, CEDAM, 1966. 
13
 E. CHELI, Ruolo dell’esecutivo e sviluppi recenti del potere regolamentare, in Quaderni costituzionali, 1990, p. 53 at 
p. 65. 
14
 G. ZAGREBELSKY, Manuale di diritto costituzionale. Il sistema delle fonti del diritto, UTET, 1988, p. 53. 
15
 T. GINSBURG-T. MOUSTAFA, Introduction: The functions of Courts in authoritarian regimes, in Rule by law. The 
politics of Courts in authoritarian regimes, edited by the same authors, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 1-22. 
16
 G.U. RESCIGNO, Sul principio di legalità, in Diritto pubblico, 1995, p. 247 at p. 262. 
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ECtHR, and the European Court of Justice, ECJ) have been facing several cases in which they 
provided hints for the identification of a lowest common denominator in the interpretation of the 
principle of legality. And both ended up in leaning towards a more substantial definition of it, not so 
far from that elaborated in the common law systems.  
In order to better explain such an evolution, it appears to be worth moving on from an aspect of the 
problem of democratic legitimacy of supranational legal orders: we will refer to this problem using 
the formula of “democratic disconnect”, introduced by Peter Lindseth with regard to the European 
Union and, to some extent, applicable also to the system of rights protection of the ECHR.17 
According to this idea, there is a need for “rethinking of the linkages between supranational norm-
production and democratic legitimation derived from the national level”. Thus, one might try to 
approach the supranational dimension of the principle of legality, assuming that the European legal 
space experienced the lack (or perhaps, the insufficiency) of links between the system of sources of 
law and the channels of democratic legitimacy. In particular, with regard to the EU law, one should 
talk about “indifference” to democratic-based legislation (somehow related to the tension between 
its telos of an ever closer union and the demos problem),18 whereas, in the ECHR system, it seems 
more appropriate to underline the impossibility – from the point of view of the Court of Strasbourg 
– to operate any such re-connection. 
Starting from the latter, the ECtHR fostered a shift to a much more comprehensive concept of “law” 
in the interpretation of those clauses of the Convention which assign the discipline of the exercise of 
fundamental rights to national “law”, as a means both to protect and to implement them. The 
concept of “law” has been broadened to include not only parliamentary legislation (as it would have 
been typical in the tradition of civil law countries), but, progressively, also delegated legislation and 
subsequent sub-legislative acts approved by the governments, customary law and judicial 
precedents19. As mentioned, this process developed essentially upon the basis of necessity: in a 
context such as the Council of Europe, in which 47 different Member States are called to co-exist 
whilst maintaining their own legal cultures, it is easily understandable that the ECtHR is simply not 
able to take into consideration all the possible declinations of 47 national systems of sources of law, 
all different from one another, in number, nature, and the respective allocation of ranks within the 
hierarchy of the norms. 
                                                 
 
17
 P. LINDSETH, Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing the Democratic Disconnect in the European 
Market-Polity, in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 151, and Power and Legitimacy. Reconciling Europe and Nation-State, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, p. 234. 
18
 J.H.H. WEILER, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, in European 
Law Journal, 1995, p. 219-258. 
19
 see, in details, infra. 
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To better understand the “necessity” for this first kind of “democratic disconnect”, it has to be 
underlined that the ECtHR cannot decide upon the basis of the validity of the internal legal acts: 
firstly, because the validity can be correctly assumed as a category of interpretation only within 
each individual legal system (to wit, judging upon the basis of the national constitution), and not 
from the point of view of a supranational court that decides upon the basis of an international 
treaty;20 secondly, because the ECtHR is not a judge of abstract law, but a judge of concrete 
individual rights. Consequently, it has to deal directly with the substance of the controversies, thus 
putting the analysis of the formal legal framework in which the claimed violation is set into the 
background. Doing so, the ECtHR, per necessity, operates in a way closer to a judge of common 
law, deciding the individual case upon the basis of the (few) provisions of the Convention, but 
mainly developing its own framework for the solution of the subsequent jurisprudence21. Finally, 
one must not forget that the ECtHR has no powers to invalidate acts subject to its scrutiny: since it 
has to take less into account the consequences of its own decision beyond the individual case at 
issue and beyond its own jurisprudence, it tends also to pay less attention to the systemic 
consequences of its decisions in the national legal system,22 thus remaining, to a certain extent, 
“disconnected” from it.23 
On the other hand, the ECJ, like the EU itself, has a limited domain of competences, upon the basis 
of the principle of conferral (Art. 5 TEU). Due to this, it operates only in a “horizontal” way: in the 
sense that the ECJ is in charge of verifying only the level of compliance with forms and procedures 
of the law-making process among the EU institutions and within them, whereas it holds no powers 
to scrutinize national law from this perspective. National law can be scrutinized only in order to 
check the fulfillment of a EU obligation and, anyway, no attention is paid at the European level to 
the form and the rank of the national measure of implementation.24 
                                                 
 
20
 A. STONE SWEET-H. KELLER, Introduction to A Europe of Rights. The impact of the ECHR on national legal systems, 
Oxford University Press 2008, p. 13-15. 
21
 V. ZAGREBELSKY, La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo sessant’anni. Pensieri di un giudice a fine mandato, 
www.csfederalismo.it/images/pdf/lecture_spinelli_2011.pdf, p. 6. 
22
 F. GALLO, Rapporti tra Corte costituzionale e Corte EDU, 
www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/relazioni_internazionali/RI_BRUXELLES_2012_GALLO.pdf, p. 4. 
23
 This situation might change in the next future, depending on whether and how the Members of the Council of Europe 
will implement the contents of the Brighton Declaration, signed on the 20th April 2012 and specifically its point 12 d), 
according to which a system close to the preliminary reference should be established also to the ECtHR (see, again, F. 
GALLO, supra n. 22, p. 9). 
24
 Altough non immediately related to the EU law stricto sensu, a slight difference could be found with reference to the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the so called ‘Fiscal 
compact’), at least concerning the provision of its art. 3.2, where Member States are required to pass “provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional” (emphasis added). However, the same provision 
continues as follows: “or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary 
processes”, thus confirming what claimed in the text. In the literature, see L. BESSELINK-J.H. REESTMAN, The Fiscal 
Compact and the European Constitutions: “Europe Speaking German”, inEuropean Constitutional Law Review, 2012, p. 7 
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Moreover, other characteristics of the EU legal systems seem to be in favour of the above-
mentioned “disconnect” between the rank of legal acts and the level of democratic participation in 
their approval: the nomen and the legal rank of the acts of secondary legislation (such as 
“regulation” or “directive”) depend on the prescription of the Treaties upon the basis of their effects 
and not because of the procedure for their approval. In other words, according to the Treaties, there 
is no difference whatsoever between a regulation approved under consultation procedure or one 
approved under ordinary legislative procedure (in which the participation of the European 
Parliament is full and active).  
Both Courts deserve some further elaboration, taking into account – albeit briefly – some trends in 
their case-law which are essential to the present analysis. 
In the first years of activity, the Court of Strasbourg seemed to adopt quite a formalistic idea of 
“law”, identifying it with the classical concept of parliamentary legislation. In particular, in Zand25, 
the Commission (i.e., the body which was operative at that time) made it clear that the reference to 
the “law” was meant to avoid any governmental regulation on the matter; secondly, in a more 
specific way, that “judicial organization in a democratic society […] should be regulated by law 
emanating from Parliament”. The same decision admits the intervention of delegated legislation in 
this matter (§68), although it requires that the fundamental backbone of the organizational 
framework has to be directly established by the legislature. In short, this decision shows how the 
earlier case-law of the ECtHR agreed with the democratic essence of the civil law conception of 
“law”, as the role of the Parliament in legislation was considered essential in itself to constrain the 
discretion of the Executive, beyond the substance of the concrete measure and its higher or lower 
level of inherent quality. 
These first statements in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR were suddenly overtaken just a few years 
later in The Sunday Times26. The Court here was quite explicit in broadening the concept of law, 
stating that “the word ‘law’ in the expression ‘prescribed by law’ covers not only statute but also 
unwritten law” (§47). Delving into the motivation used by the Court, one discovers that the Court 
resorted to an argument close to originalism in order to defend the legal tradition of the country in 
which the case was set, recalling that “it would [have been] clearly contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the Convention to hold that a restriction imposed by virtue of the common law is not 
‘prescribed by law’ on the sole ground that it is not enunciated in legislation”, since this would have 
                                                 
 
25
 ECtHR 16 May 1977, Case No. 7360/76, Zand v Austria. 
26
 ECtHR 26 April 1979, Case no. 6538/74, The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom. 
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deprived “a common-law State which is Party to the Convention of the protection of Article 10 (2) 
and struck at the very roots of that State’s legal system”.27 
The step taken by the Court in The Sunday Times, in order to recognize the specificity of the 
common law legal orders, is important both in the individual case, as well as in a more general 
perspective. In the individual case, it was a way to open the reasoning of the Court to one of the 
major legal cultures, especially on a crucial topic such as the freedom of expression. Hence, from a 
more general point of view, the necessary uniformity in right-protection among the Member States 
would have led, sooner or later, to an application of the same principle also to civil law countries. 
After that, the evolution of the case law before the ECtHR went precisely in this direction. It is easy 
to find a clear evolution in the sense of broadening the concept of “law”, which now includes not 
only written acts of lower rank than parliamentary statutes and customary law, but also (and 
significantly) the case law of Member States, conditional to its stability and accessibility: that is, 
providing a clear, precise and foreseeable legal command. 
With regard to acts of clear sub-legislative rank, the Court had already admitted a less strictly 
demanding interpretation of the “lawfulness”, in the sense that it had not to be taken as the 
legislative nature of the national measure, but as a sufficient level of the precision and clarity of its 
content as well as the easy accessibility for the addressees.28 More explicitly in Ekin Association29, 
the Court stated that “the concept of ‘law’ must be understood in its ‘substantive’ sense, not its 
‘formal’ one [, i]t therefore includes everything that goes to make up the written law, including 
enactments of lower rank than statutes” (§46). 
Coming to decisions that had direct concern with regard to Italy, two cases were related to the 
Italian National Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio superiore della magistratura) and its internal 
guidelines on the limits of the freedom of association for judges, with specific reference to the 
possibility of their participating in the Freemasonry lodges. Both in N.F.30 and later in Maestri31, the 
violation of the Convention was not found on the grounds of the nature of the act, nor on its rank, 
nor with regard to the body that approved it. The only violation was found in the wording of the 
guidelines, which was quite vague and not sufficiently clear to be perceived as the source of a 
                                                 
 
27
 T.A. O’DONNEL, Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, 1982, p. 474-507. Sepcifically on the case (and on the follow-up in the UK legal 
order): W.M. WONG, The Sunday Times Case: Freedom of Expression Versus English Contempt-of-Court Law in the 
European Court of Human Rights, in NYU Journal of International Law and Politic, 1984, p. 35-76. 
28
 ECtHR 10 March 1972, Cases nos. nos. 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium. 
29
 ECtHR 17 July 2001, Case no. 39288/98, Ekin Association v France. 
30
 ECtHR 2 August 2001, Case no. 37119/97, N.F. v Italy. 
31
 ECtHR 17 February 2004, Case no. 39748/98, Maestri v Italy. 
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concrete sanction.32 Hence, the Court grounded the lack of foreseeability of the sanction in the light 
of the preparatory works, underlining how the participation to the Freemasonry had been discussed 
only with regard to the progression of judges’ careers, and not also in the context of their 
disciplinary supervision.33 
More recently, in the case Savino and Others34, the theoretical problem is quite the opposite: the 
applicants contested the recognition as “law” of an act (a minor parliamentary regulation, 
concerning the judicial protection of officials of the Chamber of Deputies) which, albeit approved 
by a parliamentary body, had not been passed by the plenary, but (only) by the Presidium (Ufficio di 
Presidenza) of the Chamber of Deputies35. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged two claims: firstly, that 
the regulation was hardly accessible (as it was not published in the Official Journal); secondly, that 
the impartiality of the judgment was not guaranteed, since the final body of appeal was to the same 
institution as that of the rule-maker. The ECtHR agreed only on this last point, rejecting the other 
pleas, and recognizing the “lawfulness” of the regulation approved by the Presidium, using the – 
factual, rather than systematic – argument that the regulation was actually accessed by the 
plaintiffs36 and referred back to the case-law of the Italian Constitutional Court and the Italian Court 
of Cassation on parliamentary rules of procedure in order to recognize the regulatory independence 
of the Parliament in its domestic jurisdiction.37 
The above-described evolution in the case law may be considered as a development of the broader 
doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” – a dominant theme of ECtHR jurisprudence – in particular 
in its “structural” concept, more than in its “substantive” concept.38 The “substantive” concept of 
the margin of appreciation consists of recognizing that each society has to be entitled to some 
discretion in “resolving the inherent conflicts between individual rights and national interests or 
among different moral convictions”.39 On the other hand, the “structural” concept of the margin of 
appreciation, which is relevant to the purpose of this paper, is a feature proper to a supranational 
judicial system and a subsidiary jurisdiction, thereby implying a certain degree of deference to the 
                                                 
 
32
 The guidelines were in fact limited to the expression “the membership raises delicate problems”, without specifying 
the nature nor the entity of the sanction. 
33
 See Maestri, supra n. 31, § 40. 
34
 ECtHR 28 April 2009, Cases nos. 17214/05 42113/04 20329/05, Savino and Others v Italy. 
35
 … consisting of the President, the vice-presidents and other MPs appointed to specific duties. 
36
 Almost immediately after the decision, the regulation, as modified in order to comply with it, was integrally 
published (for the first time) in the Official Journal. 
37
 S.M. CICCONETTI, Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo e autodichia parlamentare, in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 2010, 
p. 1271-1279; C. FASONE, L’autodichia delle Camere dopo il caso Savino. Una condanna (lieve) da parte della Corte 
di Strasburgo, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato e Europeo, 2009, p. 1074-1089. 
38
 G. LETSAS, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2007, 
p. 80. 
39
 E. BENVENISTI, Margin of appreciation, consensus and universal standards, in NYU Journal of International Law 
and Politics, 1999, p. 843-854. 
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national legal system, at least for the institutional architecture of each individual Member State. We 
could further refine these definitions with regard to the cases analyzed, underlining a narrower 
technical dimension of the margin of appreciation: in the sense that the ECtHR looks at the 
existence of a law, of whatever kind it is, regardless of its position in the internal legal order, but 
nonetheless requiring, grosso modo, the same standards of legal certainty for all types of internal 
measures. 
EU law seems to suffer another kind of “democratic disconnect”, which is equally consistent with 
the present analysis. Again following the hints provided by Peter Lindseth’s theory, European 
integration can be interpreted as being in continuity with the “constitutional settlement” of the 
second half of the XX century, in the sense that it boosted an already existing tendency of 
delegation of normative powers to the executive.40 As a result, we have been experiencing the 
dissociation between the delegation of normative powers to the supranational level via national 
governments and the sources of democratic legitimacy, which are hard to move from the nation 
states. Such a dissociation ends up being quite paradoxical, as it is increasingly leading to a 
relocation of the rule of law at European level, in the absence – or, at least, in a situation of clear 
weakness – of the conditions upon which it typically relies: namely, the cultural and political 
homogeneity of the social community.41 Moreover, other authors have underlined how the 
“construction” of Europe took a pure “judicial” way, emphasizing how it is due to the 
empowerment of EU and national judges beyond any kind of democratic-based transfer of 
legitimacy,42 with the result of “transforming” the legal orders of the member States, even before 
the entry into force of the major reforms of the Treaties in the 90s.43 
In short, legality within the EU law is a form of legality that has been built without the existence of 
a political community and with a system of sources of law not founded on an act deriving it 
legitimacy from its parliamentary deliberation and approval. Consequently, rather than recognizing 
a higher value to the products of the will of the legislator (in hypothesis, a European loi as 
expression of a European volonté générale), it implies the “lack of the traditional distinction 
between statute and administrative act in Community law”.44 
This is not to say that there is no underlying principle of legality in EU law. If the substantial 
protection granted by the same principle is quite robust, its “democratic” dimension appears really 
thin. In other words, those assumptions of the literature according to which there is a necessary 
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linkage between the form of government and the system of sources of law45 do not seem to be 
confirmed at EU level. Moreover, differently from the system of the ECHR depicted above, this 
condition of indifference towards the democratic aspects of lawmaking is a stable characteristic of 
the EU legal order and not something that has been acquired through time. 
Some references to the case law of the ECJ will help to present this idea more clearly. 
In the famous case Partie ecologiste “Les Verts”,46 it is possible to find the first affirmation of the 
rule of law in the EU, at least in its “regulatory” dimension.47 In this decision, the EEC is defined as 
a “community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its member States nor its institutions 
can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with 
the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”.48 Thus, although the ECJ affirmed the subjection of 
both the Member States and the European institutions to the rule of law, it occurs without any 
further specification on the “specialty” of that law stemming from the representative body. It is true 
that, in some prior decisions (and, notably in the case Roquette Frères),49 the Court stated that the 
participation of the peoples “in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly” is deemed as a “fundamental democratic principle”. However, this orientation has to be 
interpreted in the light of the time in which the decision was adopted (namely, just after the first 
direct election of the EP) and yet, in the very end, it remained limited to the distribution of 
competences between the Council and the EP. Furthermore, the identification of the ECC (and then 
the EU) as a “community of law” has been exactly the way through which the ECJ affirmed its own 
regulatory role, so that its creative power has no equals in any other legal order (even in those based 
upon the judge-made law), whereas its decisions are fully taken as “sources of law” in the national 
legal orders.50 
In the subsequent case law51 the review of the legality of the acts seemed to remain to the (quite 
narrow) control of the legal basis, in terms of ensuring the compliance with the principle of 
conferral, as well as the division of competences among the institutions and the respect of the 
prescribed procedure,52 without stressing the “democratic added value” of the acts elaborated 
through an open debate in the EP. 
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It still remains to be seen whether the raised number of the acts to be approved under the ordinary 
legislative procedure as well as the new provisions on the democratic principles in the EU 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 9-12 TEU) will have any impact in the case law of the 
Court. The stress added on representative democracy as a foundation of the functioning of the EU 
might be further interpreted as a recognition of an added value for those acts approved with the 
involvement of the EP as the representative body of European citizens and with the contribution of 
the National Parliaments through the mechanisms of protocols nos. 1 and 2. Although some 
scholars do not share this point of view, opting for a more formal perspective in continuity with the 
past,53 what could constitute the real counterbalance of the mentioned “democratic disconnect” is 
the increasing involvement of National Parliaments in the democratic life of the EU. Rather than 
expecting a sudden discovery of the democratic dimension of legality on the part of the ECJ, the 
emerging action of National Parliaments as active players in the EU decision-making could lead to 
a radical change of scenery. In particular, their involvement in the subsidiarity check cannot be 
limited only to a legal contribution in evaluating the respect of the division of competences between 
the EU and the member States, but has to be opened to a more comprehensive participation in the 
elaboration of the policies (as the example of the first “yellow card”, with the Commission retiring 
its proposal, although arguing that the subsidiarity principle had not been breached, showed).54 
 
 
3.	 THE	 REFLECTIONS	 OF	 THESE	 NUDGES	 INTO	 THE	 ITALIAN	
LEGAL	 ORDER	 (AND	 IN	 PARTICULAR,	 IN	 RECENT	 DECISIONS	 OF	
ITALIAN	HIGHEST	COURTS)	
 
 The above-mentioned trends in the supranational legal orders have led, in an explicit or 
implicit form, to significant novelties in the decisions issued by the highest Italian Courts. As usual, 
it is not easy to summarize the results of an evolution that is currently ongoing and that stems from 
Court decisions: what it is possible to underline are some results that are obviously provisional (as 
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such, subject to further developments) and even fragmented in time and related to several subject 
matters. 
However, once the idea of legality based upon substantial elements rather than upon the formal rank 
of parliamentary statutes had been affirmed at supranational level, both the Court of Cassation (the 
“Supreme” Court) and the Constitutional Court are slowly moving along the same direction. On the 
one hand, they embraced the trend opened by the ECtHR, broadening the concept of “legislation” 
far beyond the sole parliamentary statute (or other acts with the same legal force); on the other 
hand, an increasing relevance has been attributed to a thick meaning of legality, setting aside more 
formalist interpretations based solely upon the democratic derivation of parliamentary statutes. 
Before analyzing the reception in the Italian legal order of these hints coming from the ECJ and the 
ECtHR, it might be helpful to recall some fundamental steps taken in the last few years by the 
Italian Constitutional Court on a more general scale, that went clearly in the sense of an opening of 
the Italian legal order to the supranational jurisdictions.55 Firstly, with the Decisions no. 348 and 
349 in 2007, the Court declared the ECHR (and the case law of the ECtHR) as suitable to integrate 
the Constitutional parameter in the judicial review of legislation.56 Secondly, with the subsequent 
decision no. 103/2008, the Constitutional Court proceeded to submit the first preliminary reference 
to the ECJ, finally coming to the acknowledgment of its belonging to the category of “courts or 
tribunals of a Member State” (art. 267 TFEU, at that time art 234 TEC).57 
With regard to the broadening of the concept of “law”, in 2010, the Court of Cassation adopted a 
decision that should be considered of historical value, since it formally recognized that its own case 
law can be deemed, at certain conditions, as a part of the legal framework for the solution of 
subsequent controversies, exactly as it happens for a new act passed by the legislator. This 
statement is all the more important since it is referred to one of the hardest “cores” of the legislative 
domain, such as the conditions for the revision of criminal trials. In greater detail, with the Decision 
no. 18288/1058, taken by its Criminal Joint Sections (Sezioni Unite), the Court of Cassation affirmed 
that an evolution of the “diritto vivente” (i.e. the law in action, beyond the mere wording of the 
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legislation in force), in particular when the case law is underpinned by a decision of the Joint 
Sections themselves – namely, the highest body within the Court –, can now be considered as 
having the same legal force of a new statute approved by the Parliament.59 In other words, the 
(highest) judge-made law, considering its substantive qualities, has not only been recognized as a 
proper source of law, but it has also been deemed to share the same value as decisions taken by the 
representative assemblies, following precisely the trend set by the Court in Strasbourg. 
To some extent, a similar position has been reached by the Constitutional Court in the case 
concluded with Decision no. 230/2012. In this case, the Constitutional Court dealt with the issue of 
the applicability of an abolitio criminis recognized by a Decision of the Joint Sections of the Court 
of Cassation60, investigating whether it might be applied also to closed cases, as a retrospective 
effect of a lex mitior. In the end, the Constitutional Court – after some general observations about 
the impossibility to equalize written law and case law, in a system in which the “riserva di legge” in 
penal matters implies a specific attribution for the Parliament61 – dismissed the case only because it 
could not find any decision of the ECtHR affirming the principle of the retrospectivity of the lex 
mitior on the basis of a novelty in the national case law, but such a conclusion cannot exclude that a 
future evolution in the case law of the Court of Strasbourg would lead to a parallel revirement of the 
Italian Constitutional Court. 
Along the same path of discovering a substantial idea of “law”, another important step has been 
taken by the Constitutional Court with the Decision no. 293/2010, in which the idea that 
parliamentary statutes can satisfy the principle of legality upon the sole basis of their democratic 
derivation is simply denied by the identification of those substantial features that are required for a 
legal act in order for it to be considered as “law”. Dealing with the discipline of the so-called 
“indirect expropriations” (which, by the way, generated an extremely high number of litigations 
before national courts and the ECtHR),62 the Court annulled Article 43 of the Code on 
Expropriation (adopted as delegated legislation), because of its redundancy from the parliamentary 
act of delegation. However, in a salient obiter dictum,63 the Court anticipated some further 
substantial reasons that cast robust doubts on its compliance with the qualitative requirement 
stemming from the case law in Strasbourg. Notwithstanding its formal rank as primary legislation – 
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and so, even if ever transposed into a parliamentary statute – the wording of the provision would 
have lacked in any case of the substantial characteristics of “lawfulness”, according to the quoted 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In particular, the resolution of the controversies originating from this 
provision before the Italian Court of Cassation and the Council of State diverged in such a way that 
it was impossible for the individuals to regulate their conduct in order to comply with such an 
uncertain, imprecise and unforeseeable law. Consequently, the Constitutional Court stated that the 
mere repetition of the same wording in a future parliamentary statute (thus, avoiding any problem 
with the constraints given to the delegated legislation coming from the Executive) would not be 
able to ensure its validity per se. 
In short, the combination of these two judgments reveals that parliamentary statutes are neither 
necessary, nor sufficient in themselves to ensure full compliance with the principle of legality.64 If 
this will be confirmed by the future case-law, we would have witnessed quite a dramatic innovation 
in the Italian legal order. Although the connection between the effectiveness of legality and the 
quality of (parliamentary) legislation – and, in particular, the degree of generality and abstractness 
of the latter – had already been highlighted in the literature,65 the possibility of the complete 
inadequacy of parliamentary statutes to satisfy the principle because of the lack of some substantial 
features has not been explored yet. To return to the results of the evolution of EU law: it seems that 
in the Italian legal order, too, an indifference to the democratic-based sources of law is emerging, 
whereas what really matters is the content of the legal command, in terms of its clarity, 
foreseeability and accessibility. Similar conditions can be reached by a parliamentary statute as well 
as by any other source of law; vice versa, both legislation and other legal acts can fail in the same 
attempt, thus up to a certain extent replicating, even in the Italian legal order, the above-mentioned 
“indifference” towards the supposed added value of the democratic derivation held by 
parliamentary legislation. 
A different thread of case-law before the Constitutional Court shows a significant number of 
decisions: in which explicit references were made to the principle of legality in its “substantial” 
sense, that is to say, going beyond the formal rank of the legal acts involved in the controversy, in 
order to look for a more comprehensive basis able to ensure that the law can rule effectively. 
Decision no. 115/2011 is particularly meaningful in this discourse. By this decision, the legislative 
provision of Article 54.4 of the Code on local authorities (as amended in 2008), which enabled a 
pervasive use of urgency decrees by the city mayors (ordinanze sindacali), has been declared 
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unconstitutional, because these ordinanze began to assume regulative content derogating the 
statutes and even to prescribe sanctions which – due to the reserve of Article 23 of the Constitution 
– should remain in the domain of the national legislator. However, in the end, the rationale of the 
censure was not to ban all regulatory power at local level. On the contrary, the infringement of the 
principle of legality in its substantial meaning was found in what the legislative provision did not 
foresee: namely, clear boundaries to the powers of the local authorities.66 Once again, the lack of 
quality in the legislative provision was at the basis of the censure of the Court. Similarly, although 
on different topics, the Court decided on the basis of legality in its substantial meaning in a 
significant number of further cases,67 affirming the insufficiency of legislative provisions due to 
their vagueness or their inadequacy in directing the administrative activity. However, this increased 
attention on the topic shows that it is a trend currently on going, whose results are still far from 
being completely perceived. 
It is interesting to register how the trend in the Italian legal order seems to follow, mostly in an 
implicit way, the nudges coming from the European Courts. In particular, some concepts elaborated 
by the ECtHR are now making themselves felt even in the reasoning of Italian Courts. Hence, the 
progressive integration with the EU legal orders is pushing the Italian judges further to abandon old 
categories of the more traditional schemes of the civil law tradition, in favor of a more 
comprehensive and substantial approach. 
Beyond these external influences, some inner dynamics of the Italian legal order, regarding the 
features of legislative procedure also seem to have contributed to this progressive shift. It is the loss 
of the supposed higher level of transparency and participation in the parliamentary law-making 
process and the “progressive decadence” of the quality of the legislative output of the Parliament 
that may have played a significant role in this evolution. 
It is probably not the case, for instance, that all the above-mentioned decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, in which the principle of legality has been interpreted in its substantial sense, were related to 
legislative provisions approved through confidence votes and the so-called “maxi-amendments”. 
This procedure leads to the approval of an entire bill going through on just a single vote, following 
the request of the government to assimilate its result in a vote of confidence in order to ensure its 
own survival. In the absence of an explicit ban of this procedure, either in the Constitution or in the 
parliamentary rules of procedure, the Constitutional Court has, so far, not deemed it as 
unconstitutional (see, for instance, Decisions nos. 391/1995 and 148/1999). On the contrary, the 
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violation of the principles stated in Articles 70 and 72 of the Constitutions (concerning the 
entitlement of the Chambers to legislation, and the requirement of different votes on each single 
article of the bill) seems to be all too self-evident.68 
However, it is patent how statutes approved through this procedure completely lack a sincere and 
full parliamentary debate which justify the precedence traditionally acknowledged to the 
expressions of the popular will. Consequently, the Constitutional Court has had, to some extent, 
necessarily to re-think the principle of legality, re-locating it according to more substantial criteria. 
 
 
4.	 CONCLUSIONS.	 THE	 NEED	 FOR	 A	 RECONCILIATION	 BETWEEN	
LEGAL	 AND	 POLITICAL	 CONSTITUTIONALISM,	 IN	 ORDER	 TO	
BETTER	RELOCATE	THE	PRINCIPLE	OF	LEGALITY	
 
 The evolution described in the Italian legal order showed how the ongoing reassessment of 
the role to be attributed to the principle of legality in the Italian legal order has been driven by the 
hints given by the supranational jurisdictions. The general (and, to some extent, passive) 
compliance with the jurisprudence of the European Courts may have been a safe solution (or a sort 
of “soft option”) for the Italian Constitutional Court, as it was able to justify such a doctrine by the 
need for a general reconsideration of the fundamental principles in the new context of the broader 
European legal space. Nevertheless, it seems possible to underline a series of disadvantages or, at 
least, unintentional consequences, deriving in the long run from pursuing this (mostly implicit) 
judicial strategy. 
Such an evolution of the interpretation of legality, that is triggered and sustained only by Courts, 
risks to import not only the “solution” from the supranational level, but also its inherent problems 
together with it. In other words, following the approach of a more substantial concept of “law” and 
setting aside every consideration for the role of democratic-based law, one risks to reproduce in the 
internal arena also the “democratic disconnect” experienced at supranational level. Thus, something 
(the “disconnect”) produced as a result of a necessity (in the area of the Council of Europe) or as a 
direct consequence of the principle of conferral (in the EU context) would have been imported to 
the national level, potentially affecting its basis of democratic legitimacy. Paradoxically, the final 
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result of this evolution would weaken the role of the National Parliament, which are exactly the 
institutions who are typically and naturally invoked as the source of democratic legitimacy69. 
The risk consists namely in leading towards an increasing dissociation between the fundamental 
aims pursued by the Courts, on the one hand, and by the Parliaments, on the other. In the end, the 
overall evolution will result in the illusion that the protection of individual rights carried out by the 
Courts can still work alone, albeit remaining perfectly separated from the implementation of public 
policies that are up to the legislator. Diversely, although carrying out different duties, both judges 
and legislators need to be (and feel) responsible for the good functioning of democracy and for the 
guarantee of fundamental rights: rights that can hardly be properly effective with the action of only 
one out of the two. Without going too far in time and space, the current Hungarian example may 
help in clarifying the possible consequences of a similar, enduring, “disconnect” between politics 
and the action of the Courts. 
In conclusion, between the two opposite (but not necessarily contradictory) positions of the so 
called “legal” and “political” constitutionalism70, the result of the evolution depicted in this essay 
seems to be much closer to the former, relying increasingly on the Courts in pursuing the formal 
coherence of the legal order and securing individual rights through the case law. Consequently, 
Parliaments would end up to be set aside from the action of securing legality, while – in the name of 
a more comprehensive and enduring guarantee of the rights of the individuals – they need to be 
included in this aim, starting to promote and protect the fundamental rights already in the 
parliamentary process and the in the enactment of the public policies. In a similar scenery, judges 
and Constitutional Courts would be anyway entitled to act in defense of individual rights, but they 
would operate as a second step of the process, surely maintaining the “final word” 71 on the legality 
in the sense of jurisdictio, but without claiming to have the “first say” in the sense of gubernaculum. 
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